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This paper is part of the online only special issue “False but Useful Beliefs”
guest edited by Lisa Bortolotti and Ema Sullivan-Bissett.
INTRODUCTION
How can false or irrational beliefs be useful?
Lisa Bortolotti∗ and Ema Sullivan-Bissett
Philosophy Department, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
(Received 22 November 2016; ﬁnal version received 5 December 2016)
For this special issue we asked leading epistemologists and philosophers of mind to bring
together their different perspectives on what it is for a false or irrational belief to be useful. It
is no surprise that false or irrational beliefs can be biologically adaptive by furthering sur-
vival and reproduction, and psychologically adaptive by enhancing self-esteem and well-
being. The research questions driving our project are: (1) whether false or irrational
beliefs can have epistemic beneﬁts; (2) how such beneﬁts interact with biological and
psychological beneﬁts; and (3) how considerations about the utility of false or irrational
beliefs affect our conception of what a belief does or should aim for, or how to best
promote the epistemic standing of a real-life agent.
The varied and thorough contributions to this special issue make progress with respect
to all three issues. Some contributors focus on the nature of the beneﬁts that false or
irrational beliefs may have. Can false or irrational beliefs have epistemic beneﬁts despite
being epistemically faulty? Can some false or irrational beliefs be necessary for successful
agency, by enhancing the agent’s motivation to pursue her goals, or by directly promoting
the fulﬁlment of such goals? Other contributors reﬂect on the implications of recognizing
such beneﬁts for our concept of belief, truth, or rationality. How does the acknowledgement
that false or irrational beliefs can be useful impact on the debate about the aims and norms
of belief? Is it always preferable to have true rather than false beliefs if false beliefs can have
beneﬁts?
Duncan Pritchard opens the special issue with his paper “Epistemically Useful False
Beliefs.” He is interested in evaluating the claim that there is a set of false but useful
beliefs, which are appropriately classiﬁed as such on the grounds of epistemic usefulness.
He considers three candidate cases which might be thought to result in false but epistemi-
cally useful beliefs: scientiﬁc ﬁctions, epistemic situationism embedded within virtue epis-
temology, and hinge commitments. He argues that merely accepting scientiﬁc ﬁctions is
sufﬁcient to reap the epistemic beneﬁts, and so there are no epistemically beneﬁcial false
beliefs to be found here. With respect to the challenge posed by certain kinds of epistemic
situationism, once again, Pritchard suggests that it is difﬁcult to describe the nature of such
cases by appeal to belief. Finally, on hinge commitments, Pritchard argues that though there
is epistemic utility, there are, as with the previous two cases, no beliefs here. Pritchard
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concludes that, at the very least, we should be suspicious of the claim that there are a phi-
losophically signiﬁcant class of epistemically useful false beliefs.
In “Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc: Some Beneﬁts of Rationalization,” Jesse Summers
asks what the beneﬁts of sincere rationalization are. He argues that rationalizing has two
broad kinds of beneﬁt. First, it enables us to identify good reasons to act given the pressure
of rational consistency. Second, it also acts as a prompt for us to impose meaningful patterns
on what are, in fact, merely permissible options. He concludes with a note of caution:
although he has identiﬁed two potential beneﬁts of sincere rationalization, he doubts that
it is as worthwhile as the alternative, modest and incomplete self-understanding. Though
these beneﬁts then may not be worth the costs, Summers aims at shedding light on what
it means for us to act on what we take to be good reasons.
In his contribution, “Do Religious ‘Beliefs’ Respond to Evidence?,” Neil Van Leeuwen
focuses on the epistemic status of religious attitudes. At the outset, he identiﬁes a puzzle
surrounding religious attitudes: some examples of religious ‘beliefs’ seem to be responsive
to evidence, whereas some seem to be completely unresponsive. Van Leeuwen seeks to
reconcile this puzzle about the nature of religious attitudes by invoking the concept of pre-
tense. He argues that religious attitudes are not responsive to evidence, but, to accommodate
the cases in which they appear to be responsive to evidence, he appeals to Kendall Walton’s
theory of make-believe. Speciﬁcally, when these attitudes seem to be responsive to evi-
dence it is because people with those attitudes are engaging in what Van Leeuwen calls
The Evidence Game.
In “On the Special Insult of Refusing Testimony,” Allan Hazlett is interested in the
claim that one can insult another by refusing her testimony. This is because, argues
Hazlett, in so doing one manifests doubt regarding the testiﬁer’s credibility. Towards the
end of the paper, Hazlett identiﬁes three applications of his conclusion. First, and most per-
tinent to the theme of the special issue, believing someone’s testimony in some cases can
represent a pro tanto good, even when that testimony is false. Second, refusing someone’s
testimony can be a way of insulting the testiﬁer. And third, in cases where we recognize that
refusing testimony can amount to insulting the testiﬁer, one’s desire to avoid this conse-
quence can dispose one to believe the testimony. In such cases, Hazlett argues, the belief
even if true, cannot amount to knowledge.
Katherine Puddifoot is interested in the epistemic costs and beneﬁts of implicit bias and
automatic stereotyping in her paper “Dissolving the Epistemic/Ethical Dilemma over
Implicit Bias.” The dilemma is one of different demands coming from the ethical and epis-
temic domains. On the one hand, we ought to respond to people equally, and on the other,
we ought to respond to people in a way which reﬂects how things are, and thus consider that
members of certain social groups are statistically more likely to possess certain traits than
members of other social groups. Puddifoot argues that, in fact, the putative dilemma offers a
false dichotomy, since failing to reﬂect social realities is the best course of action from an
epistemic point of view and also from an ethical point of view. She appeals to the notion of
epistemic innocence to capture the epistemic status of automatic stereotyping.
In her paper “Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity,” Ema Sullivan-Bissett is
interested in giving a biological account of epistemic normativity. She begins by positing
two biological functions proper to our mechanisms of belief production: the production
of true beliefs (proper function one), and the production of useful beliefs (proper function
two). She argues that this model of belief can explain epistemic normativity understood as
the claim that (1) belief has truth as its standard of correctness and (2) there are sui generis
categorical epistemic norms. The only sense in which true beliefs are correct is given by
appeal to proper function one, and the putative sui generis epistemic norms are reduced
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to doxastic strategies which facilitate the meeting of belief’s biologically grounded standard
of correctness. She gives an error account of the mistakes we make in our epistemic dis-
course, which goes via the claim that the beliefs which make up our epistemic discourse
are produced by mechanisms performing proper function two: the production of useful
beliefs. She concludes with the claim that her biological model of belief has the resources
to accommodate belief’s standard of correctness and our epistemic practice.
In “Aiming at Truth and Aiming at Success,” Lubomira Radoilska focuses on the
relationship between norms of belief and norms of action. She identiﬁes a challenge
posed by positive illusions, namely that in such cases to adhere to the norms of belief
and to adhere to the norms of action is to be pulled in opposing directions. In response
to this challenge Radoilska argues that the pursuits of aiming at the truth and aiming at
success are fully compatible. This compatibility is hypothesized to be in virtue of the
link between these two pursuits, speciﬁcally, that it is normatively appropriate to satisfy
the norm of truth in virtue of satisfying the success norm of action, and vice versa.
Radoilska takes her picture to be appealing in so far as it can explain away putative
instances of satisfying the success norm of action at the expense of the truth norm of belief.
In the ﬁnal paper of the issue, “Rational Hope,” Miriam McCormick distinguishes
between rational and irrational hope. She argues that when assessing the rationality of
hope, we need to appeal to both theoretical considerations (whether the belief that the
hope entails is justiﬁed) and practical considerations (whether the hope contributes to the
agent’s ﬂourishing). McCormick identiﬁes a tendency among philosophers to understand
mental states in either strictly cognitive, or strictly conative terms. She suggests that
hope represents a state which cannot so easily be captured by this kind of framework.
Instead, a model of hope should not have it that the norms in play are either exclusively
theoretical or exclusively practical, and indeed, reﬂection on the nature of hope and the
norms which govern it may well put pressure on the supposed sharp distinction between
cognitive and conative states.
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